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Portrait of a Tax Transplant Artist
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This article explores the process of norm migration through the study of one tax expert, Victor Thuronyi. It situates the literature on the role of
experts in tax norm migration and identifies core themes and gaps in the tax transplant literature; explores five themes, connected to the literature on
the role of tax experts and tax transplants, that arise from a study of Victor Thuronyi’s contributions to tax transplantation; and concludes with
some reflections on the benefits and challenges of having highly specialized, non-insider tax experts engaged in the exercise of drafting tax laws.
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1

LEGAL

TRANSPLANTS:

CONTESTING

‘legal irritants’ might be a more appropriate way of
describing the process of norm migration in law.6
One of the limits of the metaphor ‘transplant’ is that it
focuses substantially on the act of uprooting something
from one place and placing it in another.7 As a result, the
metaphor may temporally skew scholarly analysis. Much
of the tax transplant literature, for example, focuses on the
act of identifying a tax law and importing it somewhere
else instead of exploring the process of how norms emerge,
how they travel from one person or place to another, and
how they change when they are exposed to a new
environment.
This article explores the process of norm migration
through the study of one tax expert, Victor Thuronyi.
Choosing to focus on the work of an individual tax expert
enables two distinct contributions. First, it demonstrates
why a longer-horizon exploration of the ‘tax transplant’
metaphor is necessary to come to terms with how tax law
norms circulate among people and places. Second, it
makes central to the process of transplant the role of a

METAPHOR

Norm migration, the phenomenon of ideas, conventions,
standards, or practices transitioning among people and
places, has become a popular topic in comparative law.
Following Watson’s influential work in 1974,1 the transplant metaphor became the shorthand way to refer to this
phenomenon. It took some time for Watson’s transplant
metaphor to take root.2 But once it did, it became contested territory. At the extreme end, Pierre Legrand
claims, ‘legal transplants are impossible’.3 Others offer
more tempered assessments of the viability of legal transplants – suggesting that if not properly adjusted to suit
the new context they would be hazardous.4 Still others
have sought to revise Watson’s tax transplant metaphor
with language thought to be more appropriate to the
process of norm migration. So, for example, Esin Örücü
advocates for understanding law ‘as a series of transpositions and tunings’,5 and Gunther Teubner suggests that
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countries had teams of lawyers and economists in their
finance ministries that were used to drafting tax laws. Put
simply: Thuronyi, either individually or with one or two
members of a small group, was responsible for a great deal
of the world’s new or revised tax legislation between 1991
and 2014, at least in those countries that lacked a substantial staff that were experienced in drafting tax
legislation.
This article proceeds in three additional parts. Part 2 is
a brief section that situates the literature on the role of
experts in tax norm migration and identifies core themes
and gaps in the tax transplant literature. Part 3 explores
five themes, connected to the literature on the role of tax
experts and tax transplants, that arise from a study of
Victor Thuronyi’s contributions to tax transplantation.
Part 4 concludes with some reflections on the benefits
and challenges of having highly specialized, non-insider
tax experts engaged in the exercise of drafting tax laws.

tax expert, a possible explanatory variable in the story of
tax transplants that has been under-studied.8 Focusing on
the role of tax experts in tax law transplants is not to
suggest that their role dwarfs other possible explanations
for how or why norms migrate. There is a rich literature
in institutional theory, for example, that speculates about
(and in some cases attempts to measure) the role in norm
migration of factors like the imperialism of American
education, multinational businesses (including law
firms), legal tradition, organization of the legal profession,
underlying economic system and so on.9
Victor Thuronyi is an ideal candidate for study; he
worked at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from
1991 until 2014 in its legal department. Perhaps surprisingly, the tax law drafting function at the IMF is small. It
has generally benefitted from one to three full time staff
members and a small cluster (often not more than a dozen)
of external experts (generally senior tax academics) that
are called upon from time to time.10 In his time at the
IMF, Thuronyi was instrumental in drafting or revising
pieces of tax legislation (often multiple pieces) that were
enacted in over seventy countries and offered legislative
drafting or revision advice for another cluster of countries
that was not (at least to his knowledge) enacted. A substantial majority of the laws drafted by the tax unit were
eventually enacted, although often with revisions.
Sometimes he was the lead draftsperson; other times he
backstopped the work of another full-time staff person in
the legal department or an external expert. Thuronyi’s
start at the IMF coincided with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Hence, in his early days at the IMF, much
of his work was with transition countries, with his work
in Kazakhstan in 1995 and again in 2000 seeming to
serve as a foundational early contribution. In the 2000s,
much of his work was focused on South Asia and Africa,
with some engagement in the Caribbean and Pacific
islands. By this point, most of the former Soviet Union
countries had developed their own capacity to draft tax
laws. He (and consequently the IMF tax law drafting
group) engaged in comparatively little work in Latin
America. Thuronyi attributes this to the fact that Latin
American countries by and large had developed professional staff that were capable of drafting tax laws without
external help. It was similarly rare to work with EU
countries, with Greece as a notable outlier. Again, EU

2

THE

ROLE OF TAX LAW EXPERTS IN TAX

NORM MIGRATION AND THE TAX
TRANSPLANT LITERATURE

There is a limited scholarship on the role of tax experts in
norm migration. The legal literature might be generalized
as fitting within two narratives. The first is celebratory. In
this line of scholarship, tax experts are cowboy-style heroes, riding into difficult terrain. They are presumptively
men. They save countries by bringing one of the fundamental tools of democracy – a tax system that enables the
country to raise often badly needed revenue. The second is
critical. In this world, tax experts are the new imperial
soldiers, imposing western (or northern) norms on the
global south, often without the full participation of democratic actors. These are stylized renditions, but only
barely.
The Political Economy of Transnational Tax Reform: The
Shoup Mission to Japan in Historical Context illustrates the
celebratory approach.11 The Shoup mission to Japan is
described as iconic,12 resulting in ‘the most dramatic tax
reform program ever launched in a modern industrial
nation’.13 The contributing authors to the collection
believe that ‘one person – Carl Shoup – and his ideas
played an exceptionally important role’ in the Japanese
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‘cosmopolitan lawyers’
internationalization:

tax reform project.14 Chapters explore Shoup’s intellectual
development as well as the influences of other key tax
experts on his thinking, themes explored more later in
this article.15 Part of what inspires the confidence of
contributors to the collection in Shoup’s efforts is the
combination of his depth of expertise and the intensive
and immersive way in which he conducted the Japan
mission.16 Another feature that bolsters their enthusiasm
seems to be the authors’ conviction that Shoup’s broad
ideological orientation – that ‘increased taxes … accompanied by substantial reforms that make tax systems much
better, that is to say much fairer, more efficient, and more
transparent’ – is normatively desirable.17
In contrast to the more positive accounts, other
authors – especially Miranda Stewart – offer a more tempered, cautionary tale about the power of technical tax
experts and their role in tax transplants.18 In her 2003
account, ‘Global Trajectories of Tax Reform’, Stewart
unfolds a narrative about the shifting institutions and
focus for tax reform initiatives around the world. In this
narrative, individual experts receive occasional reference,19
but the dominant players are institutions.20 One of
Stewart’s major concerns is the trend toward ‘mass production of tax reform’, which she notes makes impossible
‘any real domestic political participation in the determination of tax policies and laws’.21 The neoliberal focus of
reform efforts, particularly in the 1990s, also seems to be a
focus for criticism.
In addition to this legal literature, there is some sociological study of the role of legal experts in the role of legal
transplants. This literature is more explanatory than normative (in the sense that it speculates about the relative
role of individual experts in effecting legal transplants). In
one of the few articles that grapples with the role of
lawyers and law firms in the spread of legal ideas among
nations, Sigrid Quack, a comparative sociologist at the
University of Duisburg-Essen, describes the function of

in

the

earlier

periods

of

Members of this ‘cosmopolitan elite of lawyers’ had in
common a high degree of renown expertise in their
respective speciality. Their reputation was built on
many years of intercultural practice as senior partners
of law firms and/or as law professors. … the cosmopolitan elite of lawyers was small and coherent enough to
develop its own common legal language and doctrines.
This made these lawyers influential actors in the highly
specialized process of rule-setting in their respective
fields of law. The more specialized an area of international or transnational law, the more likely such a
cosmopolitan elite would exist. What counted at that
time was the individual qualities of the lawyer in
question and his (or rarely her) reputation and connections within the cosmopolitan club of specialized lawyers. The activities of these outstanding legal scholars
may have been backed by the resources of their law
firms, but it was primarily their personality and expertise that took centre stage.22
Quack postulates that legal actors like lawyers and law
firms play a larger role in transnational corporate and
commercial law, suggesting that because of the technical
nature of these areas, their influence may dwarf the role
played by elected officials. She additionally argues that the
role of individual lawyers has diminished relative to the
role of regulatory organizations (like international law
firms, international professional associations, and transnational expert networks) given the shift to a phrase of
greater globalization.23 While the role of individual academic and legal experts may have diminished in some
areas of comparative law, the conclusion of this article is
that a single expert can still wield considerable influence
in tax law.
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for a broader socio-cultural exploration of the possibilities
for or implications of tax transplants.24 Fourth, some tax
transplant scholarship seeks to answer the question of
whether greater harmonization of tax laws is desirable as
a normative (or sometimes empirical) matter. This
research is often linked to scholarship that seeks to identify the ‘common core’ of tax law.25
There are four perhaps surprising gaps in the tax
transplant literature. First, there is limited scholarship
that explicitly argues in favour of tax transplants by, for
example, identifying the benefits of borrowing tax law
from another jurisdiction. Instead, it has been popular
for scholars to analyse the implications of transplanted
laws (perhaps implicitly supporting tax transplants) or to
advocate for caution in transplanting laws (whether
because there are barriers to effective transplant or
because of concerns for the cultural autonomy of receiving-nations). Nevertheless, there are a host of seemingly
obvious benefits of tax transplants, including that they
allow one country to benefit from the previous experience of another jurisdiction, they alleviate the administrative pressures of formulating new rules from scratch,
and they facilitate international activity (since international tax actors have familiarity with the imported
regime). Additionally, to the extent that the imported
tax law is robust (for example, imposes tax liability on
high-income individuals or multinationals) it may help a
receiving-jurisdiction resist internal political pressure to
make concessions to those powerful groups as part of the
law-making process.
Second, as noted above, there is limited work defining
what constitutes success of particular tax transplants.
Instead, there is an abundance of work that offers a
descriptive review of how one jurisdiction’s laws have
been borrowed by another and even more that advocates
that one country (usually the potential receiver) should
borrow the law of another country (e.g. that Canada
should adopt the US approach to controlled foreign affiliate legislation). Identifying markers of success presumably
would require considering what is necessary beyond mere
enactment. Non-tax scholarship on transplants has gone
farther in identifying the varied features of post-law
reform engagement necessary for law to successfully take
root in a jurisdiction.26 The process of legislative reform is
complex enough; yet, successful transplant requires everything from the redesign of standard precedents and forms,
effective interpretation by judges and administrative
bodies and actors, the revision of manuals and treatises,
and the design of educational programming.

Before proceeding to an exploration of the role of one
tax expert, Victor Thuronyi, in the transplant of tax law,
this article describes four major questions of the tax
transplant literature and identifies several gaps in the
transplant literature. This context is necessary to situate
the analysis of Thuronyi’s contribution, which follows.
First, what explains why and how tax laws migrate from
one jurisdiction to another? This explanatory literature is
in more limited supply than one might imagine.
Ultimately, though, scholars who seek to answer this
question are interested in whether environmental factors
(e.g. demographics or language), the spread of ideas,
economic structure, political actors, path dependency, or
some combination of factors explain why countries’ laws
develop in similar or divergent ways.
Second, some scholarship attempts to answer the question of what conditions are necessary for the success (or
failure) of a tax transplant (and broadly ignores the question of whether tax transplants are a normative good). Put
another way, this work poses the question of whether it is
possible to identify the conditions necessary for tax laws to
be effectively transplanted. Possible factors that might
influence the likelihood that a transplant takes root
include legal matters like the country’s legal history, its
underlying private law, constitutional framework, civil
procedure, treaty networks, availability of trained legal
advisors, and the independence of its judicial and executive branches; administrative matters like the depth of
administrative experience, drafting conventions, size of
the public service, and organization of ministries and
departments; economic matters like the levels of corruption, openness of the economy, size of the informal sector,
availability of financing, ratio of urban to rural population, and number and significance of multinationals; political factors including state ideology, regulatory quality,
political participation, colonial history, level of violence,
and public trust in government; social elements like residents’ willingness to pay taxes, gender and race equality,
and immigration patterns; and technological factors like
the scope of the digital economy. Undoubtedly the language of the countries in issue influences the effectiveness
of tax transplants, particularly if the receiving country has
a unique language with limited ability to read materials
produced in the originating jurisdiction. Surprisingly little of this literature is concerned with identifying what
constitutes ‘success’ in the context of tax transplantation.
Third, some tax transplant scholars question the value
of a formal approach to legal transplants (which is criticized as focusing only on ‘law on the books’) and advocate
Notes
24

Consider the observation made by John Coffee that jurisdictions with similar legal rules (e.g. governing the private benefits of control) may have very different practices
around those rules (social norms) such that the jurisdictions differ substantially. Put another way, knowing only the legal rules may not assist much in understanding the
differences among jurisdictions in their approach to particular social problems (regulated by those rules). See J. Coffee, Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149(6)
Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 2151–2178 (2001).

25

See e.g. C. Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 57(3) The Am. J. Comp. L. 677–709 (2009).
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See e.g. R. Macdonald, Article 9 Norm Entrepreneurship, 43(2) Can. Bus. L. J. 240–291 at 268–271 (2006).
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3.1 Those Engaged in Transplant Work Are
Part of a Cosmopolitan Tax Elite

Third, despite broad acceptance by tax comparatists
that law is more than ‘law on the books’ and instead
encompasses also legal institutions, the activities of legal
formants and so on, little study has been made of the
transplant of anything more than tax legislation (and to a
lesser extent the borrowing of judicial precedent). One
imagines that the transplant literature would benefit from
greater exploration of how norm migration has influenced
tax concepts, administrative tax policies, the function and
design of tax administration and collection, structures of
tax dispute resolution, training for tax lawyers and judges,
the academic insights of tax scholars and so on.
Fourth, while some tax scholars have urged us to think
about the differences among countries in contemplating
tax transplants, there is limited scholarship that offers a
taxonomy of types of countries (aligned with their underlying characteristics) that might assist policymakers
attempting to identify countries whose tax laws (and
practices) might be most usefully examined – here,
Thuronyi’s work is distinguished.27 In contrast, comparative law scholars have attempted more detailed frameworks for classifying states and considering the
implications of particular characteristics for the likelihood
of effective transplant.28
In identifying themes from my conversations with
Victor Thuronyi, I was mindful of these lines of inquiry
and of the gaps in the available literature. In the remainder of this part of the article, I identify five major themes
that emerged from our conversations, some of which add
qualitative texture to the broader tax transplant debates
and the literature on the role of tax experts.

3

VICTOR THURONYI: THE

What draws someone to want to develop tax expertise and to
share that expertise with countries around the world? The
collection of articles on Carl Shoup explores that topic in
some detail.29 Victor Thuronyi’s early career trajectory shares
some features in common with Shoup’s. Both were born in
the United States and each pursued distinguished venues for
higher education (in Shoup’s case – Stanford and Columbia
(PhD), in Thuronyi’s case – Cambridge and Harvard Juris
doctor (JD)), with some training outside the US (in France
for Shoup and in the UK for Thuronyi). Each was attracted
to university teaching (Shoup at Columbia business school
and Thuronyi at State University of New York at Buffalo).
Both men spent some time working with the US Treasury
Department on tax reform.
Each also identified early, elite, tax connections. The
story of Carl Shoup is thick with references to his important mentoring relationships with Edwin Seligman and
Robert Murray Haig. Haig was chair of Shoup’s dissertation committee and Seligman took him on one of his
earliest tax missions (to Cuba).
Thuronyi similarly had important tax connections early
in his career. He took a public finance course from Martin
Feldstein, Alan Auerbach and Richard Musgrave while he
was at Harvard. He was also heavily influenced by tax
academics at Harvard Law School (Bill Andrews, Stanley
Surrey, Michael Graetz (visiting Harvard at the time) and
Alvin Warren), as well as other tax legal academics who
wrote about tax reform from an economic perspective, and
subsequently his experience on tax reform at the US
Treasury. Thuronyi read Andrews’ seminal article on consumption taxation while still a student at Cambridge, and
edited Graetz’s article on the consumption tax while on
the Harvard Law Review. At Treasury, he worked with a
team of economists in producing the Treasury Tax Reform
Studies and Proposals. This school of tax law scholarship,
of which Surrey was considered the intellectual leader,
espoused a tax reform philosophy that involved eliminating tax expenditures, broadening the tax base, taxing
economic income equally, and trying to make the tax
system more progressive. Another important influence
on Thuronyi, particularly for his international work, was
Charles McLure. Thuronyi’s first publication was a review
of McClure’s Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice?30 He
later worked with McLure at US Treasury. Instrumental
to his future career path, Thuronyi was invited by

QUINTESSENTIAL

TAX TRANSPLANT ARTIST

This portion of the article is based on a review of Victor
Thuronyi’s extensive scholarship as well as two approximately two-hour interviews. The interviews were semistructured. My initial interest in focusing on Thuronyi’s
contributions was driven by the notable split in views
about the desirability of deploying technical tax expertise
in the way that Thuronyi did. I was hopeful that qualitative work might assist in shedding more light on the role
of technical experts in the tax transplant process. The
discussions were broader than just the role of an individual expert, however, and they were informed by the tax
transplant literature.

Notes
27

Victor Thuronyi’s rough and ready classification of tax families is one starting resource. See V. Thuronyi et al., Comparative Tax Law (2d ed., Wolters Kluwer 2016).

28

See e.g. R. Peerenboom, Toward a Methodology for Successful Legal Transplants, 1(1) The Chinese J. Comp. L. 4–20 (2013).
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See Brownlee, Ide & Fukagai, supra n. 11; Ates, supra n. 16. See also A. P. Dourado, Is This a Pipe? Validity of a Tax Reform for a Developing Country, in Tax, Law and
Development, c. 6 (Y. Brauner & M. Stewart eds, Edward Elgar 2013). Dourado posits a perfectly cosmopolitan tax expert: female, with excellent substantive tax knowledge
(both comparative and theoretical), with policy influences, who takes her work serious and with the support of the host country as well as with access to thoughtful,
democratic input. In this context, and with the aid of the lens of legal pluralism, Dourado expresses optimism for the role of a tax expert in tax reform.

30

V. Thuronyi, Book Review of Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? By Charles McLure, 93(2) Harvard L. Rev. 462 (1979).
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McClure to join a mission to Colombia in the late-1980s.
McLure brought together Professors Richard Bird, Jack
Mutti, and George Zodrow as additional members of the
team. The work to review and reform the tax system in
Colombia seemed exhaustive, not unlike the Shoup mission (if considered together with the earlier effort led by
Musgrave, in which both McLure and Bird also participated). The mission team prepared an extended discussion
of their analysis of the Colombian system and related
recommendations in a book that rivals many of the larger
tax commissions of that era in its comprehensiveness.31 In
the book’s foreword, Richard Bird describes the mission
process as reflecting ‘a Colombian tradition of defining an
interesting and important policy problem, asking some of
the leading experts in the world to consider and to propose solutions for the problem and then, after full public
discussion, drawing on the work of these experts to design
a made-in-Columbia solution’.32 Thuronyi was largely
responsible for preparing the chapters on the taxation of
income from business, capital, and wealth.33
These stories – Shoup and Thuronyi’s – offer some
insight into what features might attract someone to
make a major commitment to tax reform on an international scale. Early exposure to ideas from outside the home
jurisdiction seems a component part; the advantage of
elite American education; connections to the tax elite of
the times; and a genuine cosmopolitan curiosity seem to
be essential ingredients.

He does, however, place importance on language, as far
as legal drafting is concerned.. Thuronyi believes firmly
that it was desirable, sometimes even essential, for the
foreign tax expert advisors to be able to work in the home
country language. So, for example, he was committed to
ensuring he regularly worked with experts with Chinese,
Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, French, English and Russian
language skills. In addition, Thuronyi learned Latin,
German, French and Spanish by the time he had completed high-school and he re-learned Russian (which was
his original first language) when he started offering technical advisory services in Russia. He also developed some
capacity in Romanian and Italian (similar to Latin),
Ukrainian, Czech (similar to Russian), and Portuguese
(similar to Spanish). This commitment to participating
on a more even language footing with the government
actors in the home country seems atypical in the world of
tax technical experts. Indeed, it reflects a rarefied form of
cosmopolitan elitism to be able to find such linguistic
diversity within one person.

3.3 Intellectual Curiosity, Scholarly
Engagement, and Comparative Tax Study
Are Essential Characteristics of a Tax
Transplant Artist
Throughout his career, Thuronyi maintained his commitment to scholarship and to staying abreast of work
authored by tax academics.35 He motivated two major
contributions that supported his advisory work: Tax Law
Design and Drafting,36 a two-volume text published originally in hard copy and now available free on the IMF
website, and Comparative Tax Law.37 These works defined
the field.38 Tax Law Design and Drafting features many
leading tax academics, several of whom worked as technical experts with Thuronyi. The text is regularly relied
upon by tax administrators in medium- and low-income
countries who are seeking to reform their tax systems.
Indeed, that was precisely Thuronyi’s intent in developing
the project in the first place. Comparative Tax Law is
perhaps a little less accessible to tax administrators and

3.2 At Least Some ‘Cultural’ Factors Must Be
Accommodated
The literature on comparative tax law ranges substantially between those who are more functionalist and
those who are more culturalist in their orientation. It
is fair to say that Thuronyi leans to the functionalist.
For example, in his contribution to the Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law on tax, he observes that,
‘regardless of the differences in legal culture or tradition, legislatures in different countries often come to
similar tax policy judgments’.34
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C. McLure Jr. et al., The Taxation of Income from Business and Capital in Colombia (Duke University Press 1990).

32

Ibid., at xiii.
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Ibid., Acknowledgements (not paginated).
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V. Thuronyi, Tax Law, in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2d ed., J. M. Smits ed., Edward Elgar Publishing 2014).
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Notably, Thuronyi authored or co-authored about 25 books and articles in his time at the IMF.

36

Tax Law Design and Drafting, Vol. 1 (V. Thuronyi ed., IMF 1996) and Tax Law Design and Drafting, Vol. 2 (V. Thuronyi ed., IMF 1998).

37

V. Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law (Kluwer Law International 2003) and Thuronyi et al., supra n. 27. Thuronyi also co-authored A. Schenk, V. Thuronyi & W. Cui, Value
Added Tax: A Comparative Approach (2d ed., Cambridge University Press 2015), which makes a substantial contribution to our understand of the design of VATs around the
world, but which has not received the same comparative law attention as the two contributions identified in the text above, likely because of its more specific focus.

38

Every serious scholarly piece on comparative tax law cites one, or both, of these contributions. For reviews, see J. Azzi, Book Review: Tax Law Design and Drafting (Vol. 2):
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wording of the law is found. This kind of approach
can bring in experience and best practices from other
countries and has helped local officials to deliver well
drafted tax laws for consideration by the government
and eventually by Parliament.40

its audience is more likely students and academics; nevertheless, it captures Thuronyi’s deep and broad knowledge
of tax laws around the world and advances his argument
that countries can be grouped into families that allow
those interested in tax study to obtain some predictive
insights about the whole family through the careful study
of the tax laws of one of the related countries.
Comparative study clearly influenced many of
Thuronyi’s drafting decisions. He affirmed, perhaps
unsurprisingly, that ‘I really did take comparative law
seriously, and … tried to figure out what the actual
differences were in legal forms and viewpoints’. As a
concrete example, in talking about designing a general
anti-avoidance rule, he observed that the ‘approach I took
was a pretty simple approach … you look at the experience and what other countries have done’. His enthusiasm
for comparative tax law is succinctly articulated in a short
contribution to Tax Notes.39

Thuronyi’s shift from the more intensive and extended
work reflected in the Shoup mission or Thuronyi’s earlier
mission to Columbia, to a less intensive approach was by
design. It enabled him to work with a more ambitious list
of countries. Early in his time at the IMF, he began
developing model tax codes – with variances for legal
systems and languages – that could be used as a basis
for the next project to avoid the additional work of starting each drafting project from scratch. (This approach was
started by his predecessor at the IMF, Richard Vann.
Thuronyi built on Vann’s approach, in particular by
extending it beyond English-speaking countries.) He
also reduced the time spent on return visits and generally
avoided working on subsidiary legislation, administrative
guidance, or training and education. These limitations
were inherent in the process and he accepted them as a
sensible compromise, ‘I went all over the place, and once I
drafted something, in a particular country, I sometimes
wouldn’t even come back … so [I would] not have the
type of intense relationship that it would take to really
implement some new practices’. Similarly, he acknowledges that, ‘[t]he approach that I took, which maximized
the number of laws that I was drafting, seemed like a
reasonable approach, even though I realized that a lot of
those laws would not be implemented really well’.
Thuronyi accepted the compromise between offering a
rough, but workable, legislative framework to more countries at the expense of developing a wider legal framework
(that might have included regulations, taxpayer guidance,
and education programs) and ensuring a rich, engaged
dialogue with stakeholders in the host country.
Thuronyi recognized the need for much greater focus
on training for tax administration in tax law; however, the
staff limits at the IMF precluded him from advancing
much in the way of concrete training. If he had spent
longer at the IMF, he might have been inclined to study
how tax administrations conduct training and to develop
some training plans that would enable those administrations to seek training funding from other donors. A
common refrain in Thuronyi’s approach was to focus on
the most efficient way to transfer knowledge. To that end,
it is not surprising that he might have liked to see a
centralized training agency (perhaps not at the IMF) that
would offer training.

3.4 No Matter How Effective One Hopes
‘Transplant’ Work Is, There Are
Acknowledged Limits to Non-Insider
Technical Advice
Thuronyi readily acknowledges the limits of the approach
to providing technical advice that he fostered and developed while at the IMF. In contrast to the discussion of the
early Shoup missions in Japan, for example, which
required extensive immersion, Thuronyi embraced a
streamlined approach to tax drafting. He describes that
approach in a note for tax officials in Turkey:
In terms of process, one observation I have is that it
would be useful to involve in the drafting process tax
lawyers with experience in drafting tax laws. In this
context, tax policy officials in Turkey may be interested
in the assistance that the IMF Legal Department can
offer. We have worked with numerous countries, in
modalities appropriate to each country. In some countries, the draft tax law has been prepared by local
officials and, where needed, translated into English.
Then an expert from the Legal Department (in some
cases two experts working together) has travelled to the
country to sit down with the responsible officials and
go through the draft article by article. This is an
intensive process that normally requires one or two
weeks of fairly intensive all-day meetings going
through the draft. As a result of the discussions, problems are identified, the policy intentions of the authorities are clarified, and a solution for the specific
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guessing … ’. Similarly, in describing his process for
reviewing the legislation of other countries, he says he
was often ‘just using the existing law … and kind of …
streamlining it a bit … but basing it on their existing
drafts’. And he states that, ‘ultimately, I draft what they
want to do’.
Nevertheless, in our discussions Thuronyi frequently
referred to ‘good tax policy’ assuming that such policy
was broadly-agreed upon. This aligns with Stewart’s perception that the discourse of tax reform has ‘led to the
flourishing of tax policy and the development of a set of
international norms (the remarkable consensus) that are
presented as basic principles for a successful tax system’.42
Stewart reflects that this remarkable consensus ultimately
results in the depoliticization of tax reform:

3.5 Defining Success and Its Connection to an
Ideal Tax System
As Leyla Ates nicely puts it, ‘[d]etermining the success
and failure of tax reform is specifically complicated by the
lack of widely accepted metrics’.41 At a basic level, one
could imagine measuring the success of a legal transplant
by its enactment and that certainly seems to be the
dominant view. Yet, there are laws that are enacted and
never enforced; and laws that are never enacted, but that
alter the way we think about taxation. More sophisticated
approaches might attempt to determine other markers of
success – like whether a reform project increases revenue
raised, results in redistributed income, raises citizen confidence in government spending, or achieves particular
economic, social or political goals.
In our conversations, it was clear that Thuronyi saw a
difference between the role of those who draft tax laws and
those who serve as tax policy analysts. He asserts, ‘[t]ax
law drafters have to really think of themselves as lawyers,
not economists’. This disciplinary boundedness may be
the result of the design of the functions within the IMF
itself – where the tax law drafters reside within the legal
department and the economists reside with the fiscal
affairs department. The result is a relatively narrow concept of the function of tax law drafting expertise. But
bifurcation has an unexpected advantage: it appears to
have provided Thuronyi with some flexibility in determining when a reform project was successful.
Our discussion revealed a less dogmatic commitment to
any given tax drafting decision than some of the literature
on the role of tax law experts in tax transplants might
predict. The critical scholarship on transplants often offers
up a narrative of ‘institutions taking positions’ in monolithic ways. The IMF separation between tax law drafters
(housed in the legal department) and tax economists
(housed in fiscal affairs) meant that often there was little
cooperation: projects were either legal projects or Fiscal
Affairs Department (FAD) projects. And when a project
was primarily left with Thuronyi in the legal department,
‘by and large, they didn’t really care that much about it’.
That structural design feature within the IMF may have
left Thuronyi with more liberty to define his own
approach to tax law drafting.
Instead of forcefully pressing his own view on tax
policy, in many cases, Thuronyi’s response to questions
about success was focused on the important function of
providing support for countries’ reform efforts. For example, he suggested that ‘[m]ostly, it was just a matter of
making sure that their existing law was coherent and it
made sense as a statute. … I wasn’t going to be second

Tax reform discourse is primarily an economic discourse, and it claims to be scientific largely through
its affiliation with economics and public finance theory.
The technical nature of tax reform discourse gives it
added authority … . Legal practitioners of tax reform
tend to rely uncritically upon the international norms
of the tax reform discourse when drafting tax laws for a
particular country. In addition, tax lawyers bring into
the tax reform discourse a heavy emphasis on rules and
drafting as a solution to problems of taxation in developing and transition countries. Both the economic and
legal aspects of tax reform discourse depoliticize tax
reform, reducing it to a matter of mechanics.43
Despite clearly holding a view of what constitutes good
tax policy, Thuronyi did not seem particularly troubled
by countries’ interest in maintaining elements of their
tax system that did not align with his vision. He
considered himself as a temporary civil servant in the
countries where he worked, seeing his role as giving
advice but also implementing the policy decisions of
the authorities even where they conflicted with that
advice. He jokingly noted that ‘there are many countries that have things that don’t work, that are peculiar
to them and that they like to hang on to’. In other
instances, he pointed to unique approaches adopted by
some countries that had little grounding in tax policy;
but often he found that those differences had little
consequence for the application of the law. For example,
he recalled that for Value Added Taxes in the former
Soviet Union countries there are often three categories – goods, work, and services. But since work
and services are treated the same for tax purposes,
having three categories instead of two makes no substantial difference to the application of the rule. Put
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another way, there may be cultural differences in drafting, but sometimes those differences have no real tax
effect.
Thuronyi also exerted limited influence over the design
of different models by external experts. He noticed that
‘different people were working on different laws in different countries and they were ending up being different’.
These factors suggest less uniformity in approach than
might be imagined by some of the standard narratives
about how tax transplants are imposed.
Thuronyi was attentive to, but not constrained by,
enactment as a marker of success. In considering the
signal that enactment sends about the success of a reform
project, he said, ‘does that [enactment] mean that it’s
successful in the sense of actually creating something
positive and significant for the country? No. That’s a
different standard’.
So, on one hand, the Stewart story seems to align with
Thuronyi’s narrative about tax reform – he assumes a
broad consensus on what good tax policy is and as a result
talks about it in a depoliticized way. On another level,
however, the Stewart story ignores the fractures between
the view of good tax policy held by one technical expert,
and the various ways in which that view is set aside to
advance the goals and objectives of the host country and
other expert advisors.

4

THE

A second advantage might be that transplants enable a
relatively sophisticated legal framework to be put in place,
which facilitates greater capacity building over time. For
example, in more than a few instances, Thuronyi reflected
that countries to which he originally provided substantial
drafting support eventually no longer needed that support. The initial intervention appears to have laid a foundation that could then be adapted and revised as the
country’s needs changed and as its in-house expertise
was further developed. Put another way, it is possible
that the effectiveness of a transplant needs to be measured
not only by its initial implementation, but also by the
ramifications of the transplant on future reform projects.
Disadvantages are also apparent. To the extent that tax
law drafting seems to require a belief in positive law,44
the process of transplanting tax laws offers only limited
scope for attention to what some sociologists refer to as
‘legal consciousness’.45 Put another way, the implications
of undertaking reform that relies heavily on an expert
individual become divorced from the broader power
dynamics within which legal reform and legal enforcement occur. Ultimately, tax law has ramifications for most
people’s daily lives, but the implications of a technical
drafting exercise seem quite removed from an analysis of
those implications.
Second, the policy reflected in the drafting work undertaken inevitably reflects at least to some extent the tax
policy convictions of the drafter. Most of the previous
academic work paints tax policy decision-making at a
macro level: for example, the pressure that may be
brought to bear on a country to enact a VAT. But tax
law drafting requires literally thousands of small, potentially significant, policy decisions that are often not of
much interest to international institutions (for example,
the mechanism for valuing particular in-kind employment
benefits, the design of childcare expense recognition, or
which business entities should be treated as flowthroughs). As the discussions with Thuronyi suggest,
some of those convictions might be tempered by the
institutional aims of the expert’s employer (e.g. the IMF)
and some might be tempered by the home governments
(who, for example, may be committed to particular policy
settings). Nevertheless, the commitments of the drafter of
necessity will be informed by that person’s (or small group
of persons’) educational history and ongoing engagement
with the world. For example, perhaps because of the
experts engaged, the drafting positions may only rarely
reflect a gender-budget analysis; presumably, that is the
consequence of the combination of the international organization’s position, the position of the government actors,

BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF

HIGHLY SPECIALIZED, NON-INSIDER, TAX
LAW DRAFTERS

One of the advantages of relying on the transplant of tax
laws might be the minimization of resources devoted to
the project to tax law design and drafting. Certainly,
Thuronyi’s trajectory reveals that a substantial volume of
drafting work can be undertaken by a small, dedicated
group of experts. Whether it is socially useful for each
country to develop tax law drafting capacity in-house is
open for debate; but in a world with myriad demands on
often small public sectors, it seems unlikely in many
countries that tax law drafting would be identified as a
vital and core area where building capacity is important.
Additionally, the project of getting the benefit of wide
comparative tax exposure is time consuming. For in-house
civil servants, it might require additional language proficiency, access to expensive tax databases, and substantial
technical tax expertise to make sense of the approaches
undertaken by other countries and their advantages and
disadvantages.
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middle-income states. Thuronyi’s contributions suggest
that the picture may be blurrier. It seems likely that
many of the contributors to the transfer of tax law ideas
(and law) come from a rarified elite: like Thuronyi, one
expects that they are highly-educated at exclusive institutions, that they have had the privilege of access to talented
and high-level experts in their own development, and that
they have an atypical confidence in their own ability to be
helpful. These characteristics most certainly will mean
that most high-influence tax transplanters are men, educated in high-income countries. They will have ideas
about tax that are broadly acceptable to conventional
institutions. Nevertheless, Thuronyi’s path also suggests
an open-mindedness and relative unobtrusiveness of intervention. He might have held views about tax policy
(whether developed on his own or held by the IMF), but
he did not feel that those needed to be adopted by
countries where he worked; he accepted varying levels of
country engagement in tax reform and felt that once a
threshold of drafting competence was achieved, additional
intervention was not a priority; and he approached drafting projects with creativity and a willingness to work
within the framework of the host country. The standard
narrative about the role of tax experts has overstylized
their influence and perhaps underestimated the consequences of their work.

and the particular drafters’ views about what constitutes
appropriate tax policy settings.
Ultimately, the legacy of a single technical tax expert,
even one as prolific as Victor Thuronyi, may be harder to
characterize than some of the previous scholarship suggests. Has he served as a key influence on the design and
implementation of tax laws around the world?
Undoubtedly. Are the tax laws he drafted or revised
‘transplants’ in the sense described by the comparative
law scholarship or should they be covered by a different
label, one that better reflects the process Thuronyi developed while at the IMF? In Thuronyi’s words:
I don’t think that there really is such a thing as a
transplant. … the idea of a transplant is that you’re
starting with something from one country and you’re
transplanting it to another country, but I never did
that, really. … You’re certainly bringing ideas that
have developed elsewhere. But it’s not like you’re actually transplanting.
Overstating only slightly, the literature on tax experts
tends to characterize the role of tax experts as heroic or
villainous, and the act of transplanting as a normative
good (or at least, an unquestioned good) or as a problematic incursion on the self-determination of low- and

707

